SyncJacking: Secure Your Hybrid Identity Before March 2026

Introduction

An attacker can become Global Administrator of your Microsoft 365 tenant by exploiting a vulnerability in your hybrid identity synchronization. This technique, called SyncJacking or hard-match abuse, allows compromising privileged cloud accounts via your on-premises Active Directory.

Microsoft is deploying critical application changes in March 2026 to block this attack. Without action on your part, your hybrid infrastructure remains vulnerable.

Critical Impact

This vulnerability affects all tenants using Entra Connect Sync or Cloud Sync with privileged cloud-only accounts.

Technical Anatomy of the SyncJacking Attack

Hard-match Principle

The hard-match is the mechanism that allows associating an on-premises AD object to an existing Entra ID object during the first synchronization. This association is performed via three attributes:

userPrincipalName (UPN)
mail or proxyAddresses
ImmutableId (mapped from objectGUID or ms-DS-ConsistencyGuid)

Attack Vector

The exploitation follows this sequence:

Target Reconnaissance

The attacker identifies a privileged cloud-only account (ex: BreakGlass@contoso.onmicrosoft.com) without OnPremisesObjectIdentifier attribute.

Creation of Malicious Object

Creation of an on-premises AD user with corresponding attributes:

⚡PowerShell

1# DO NOT EXECUTE - Attack Example
2New-ADUser -Name "FakeBreakGlass" `
3  -UserPrincipalName "BreakGlass@contoso.onmicrosoft.com" `
4  -EmailAddress "BreakGlass@contoso.onmicrosoft.com"

Synchronization and Overwrite

During the next synchronization cycle, Entra Connect performs a hard-match and overwrites the cloud object with properties of the on-premises object, including the password.

Exploit Architecture

MERMAID

1graph LR
2    A[AD On-Premises] -->|Sync| B[Entra Connect]
3    B -->|Hard-Match| C[Entra ID]
4    D[Privileged Cloud Account] -.->|Overwritten| C
5    E[Attacker] -->|Controls| A

Microsoft Application Changes - March 2026

OnPremisesObjectIdentifier Behavior Modifications

Behavior	Before March 2026	After March 2026
Hard-match on cloud-only	Silently Allowed	Blocked with explicit error
OnPremisesObjectIdentifier Validation	Post-synchronization	Pre-synchronization
Logging of attempts	Minimal	Detailed with correlation ID
Recovery API	Not available	Dedicated Graph endpoint

New Error Codes

{}JSON

1{
2  "error": {
3    "code": "HardMatchBlockedOnCloudOnlyAccount",
4    "message": "Hard-match attempt blocked on cloud-only privileged account",
5    "details": {
6      "targetObjectId": "guid",
7      "sourceAnchor": "base64",
8      "correlationId": "guid"
9    }
10  }
11}

Vulnerability Audit: Identify Your Exposure

Complete PowerShell Audit Script

⚡PowerShell

1# Connection to required modules
2Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "User.Read.All", "Directory.Read.All"
3Import-Module ActiveDirectory
4 
5# Audit function for at-risk accounts
6function Test-SyncJackingVulnerability {
7    param(
8        [string]$DomainSuffix = "onmicrosoft.com"
9    )
10    
11    # 1. Retrieve all privileged cloud-only accounts
12    $privilegedRoles = @(
13        "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10", # Global Administrator
14        "e8611ab8-c189-46e8-94e1-60213ab1f814", # Privileged Role Administrator
15        "158c047a-c907-4556-b7ef-446551a6b5f7"  # Cloud Application Administrator
16    )
17    
18    $vulnerableAccounts = @()
19    
20    foreach ($roleId in $privilegedRoles) {
21        $roleMembers = Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $roleId
22        
23        foreach ($member in $roleMembers) {
24            $user = Get-MgUser -UserId $member.Id -Property Id,UserPrincipalName,OnPremisesSyncEnabled,OnPremisesImmutableId,OnPremisesDistinguishedName
25            
26            # Check if it is a cloud-only account
27            if (-not $user.OnPremisesSyncEnabled -and $user.UserPrincipalName -like "*$DomainSuffix") {
28                $vulnerableAccounts += [PSCustomObject]@{
29                    UserPrincipalName = $user.UserPrincipalName
30                    ObjectId = $user.Id
31                    HasImmutableId = [bool]$user.OnPremisesImmutableId
32                    RiskLevel = if (-not $user.OnPremisesImmutableId) { "CRITICAL" } else { "MEDIUM" }
33                }
34            }
35        }
36    }
37    
38    # 2. Check for corresponding AD objects
39    foreach ($account in $vulnerableAccounts) {
40        $upn = $account.UserPrincipalName
41        $adUser = Get-ADUser -Filter "UserPrincipalName -eq '$upn'" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
42        
43        if ($adUser) {
44            $account | Add-Member -NotePropertyName "ADObjectFound" -NotePropertyValue $true
45            $account.RiskLevel = "CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED"
46        }
47    }
48    
49    return $vulnerableAccounts
50}
51 
52# Execute audit
53$results = Test-SyncJackingVulnerability
54$results | Format-Table -AutoSize

Validation via Microsoft Graph API

⚡PowerShell

1# Graph query to identify accounts without OnPremisesObjectIdentifier
2$uri = "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users?`$filter=accountEnabled eq true and onPremisesSyncEnabled ne true&`$select=id,userPrincipalName,onPremisesImmutableId,createdDateTime&`$top=999"
3 
4$headers = @{
5    Authorization = "Bearer $accessToken"
6}
7 
8$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers $headers -Method Get
9$cloudOnlyUsers = $response.value | Where-Object { -not $_.onPremisesImmutableId }

Analysis of Entra Connect Logs

⚡PowerShell

1# Search in synchronization logs
2$syncLogs = Get-EventLog -LogName "Application" -Source "Directory Synchronization" -After (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
3$hardMatchEvents = $syncLogs | Where-Object { $_.Message -match "hard.*match|immutableid.*conflict" }

Technical Remediation Plan

Phase 1: Immediate Protection

Block Unauthorized Hard-Matches

Enable preventive protection via PowerShell:

⚡PowerShell

1# Entra Connect Configuration
2Set-ADSyncScheduler -SyncCycleEnabled $false
3 
4# Add filtering rules
5$rule = New-ADSyncRule `
6    -Name "Block CloudOnly HardMatch" `
7    -Direction Inbound `
8    -Precedence 50 `
9    -SourceObjectType user `
10    -TargetObjectType person `
11    -LinkType Join `
12    -Disabled $false

Implement Real-Time Monitoring

Deploy an Azure Monitor alert:

{}JSON

1{
2  "properties": {
3    "severity": "Sev0",
4    "enabled": true,
5    "scopes": ["/subscriptions/{subscription-id}/resourceGroups/{resource-group}/providers/Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/{workspace}"],
6    "evaluationFrequency": "PT5M",
7    "windowSize": "PT5M",
8    "criteria": {
9      "allOf": [{
10        "query": "AuditLogs | where OperationName == 'Update user' and TargetResources contains 'onPremisesImmutableId'",
11        "timeAggregation": "Count",
12        "operator": "GreaterThan",
13        "threshold": 0
14      }]
15    }
16  }
17}

Update Entra Connect

Verify and update your version:

⚡PowerShell

1# Minimum required version: 2.2.8.0
2$currentVersion = (Get-ADSyncGlobalSettings).Parameters | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "Microsoft.Synchronize.ServerConfigurationVersion"}
3 
4if ([version]$currentVersion.Value -lt [version]"2.2.8.0") {
5    Write-Warning "Critical update required!"
6    # Download from https://aka.ms/AADConnectDownload
7}

Phase 2: Advanced Configuration

Recommended Configuration

Enable certificate-based authentication for the Entra Connect service account to prevent password compromise.

⚡PowerShell

1# Configure connector with certificate
2$cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -Subject "CN=EntraConnectSync" -CertStoreLocation "Cert:\LocalMachine\My" -KeyExportPolicy Exportable -KeySpec Signature -KeyLength 2048 -HashAlgorithm SHA256
3 
4# Export and configuration
5$certPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "ComplexP@ssw0rd!" -Force -AsPlainText
6Export-PfxCertificate -Cert $cert -FilePath "C:\EntraConnect\sync-cert.pfx" -Password $certPassword

Complete Validation Checklist

Recommended Weekly Validation

This checklist should be executed weekly until the complete application of March 2026 changes.

[ ] Audit of privileged cloud-only accounts: Execute the PowerShell audit script
[ ] OnPremisesObjectIdentifier verification: Confirm that all critical accounts have an immutable identifier
[ ] Analysis of synchronization logs: Search for suspicious hard-match attempts
[ ] Entra Connect version: Verify version 2.2.8.0 or higher
[ ] Synchronization rules: Validate exclusions for critical UPNs
[ ] Active monitoring: Confirm Azure Monitor alerts are operational
[ ] Identifier backup: Back up OnPremisesImmutableId of privileged accounts
[ ] Recovery test: Validate post-compromise restoration procedure
[ ] Attribute filtering: Verify that userPrincipalName is not synchronized for onmicrosoft.com domains
[ ] AD permissions audit: Limit who can create objects in synchronized OUs

Frequent Errors and Solutions

1. Synchronization of BreakGlass Accounts

Critical Error

Never include emergency accounts in the synchronization scope.

⚡PowerShell

1# Correct exclusion
2Set-ADSyncSchedulerConnectorOverride -ConnectorIdentifier $connectorId -FullImportRequired $true -FullSyncRequired $true
3Add-ADSyncAADCompanyFeature -ForcePasswordSync $false -ForceUserPrincipalNameSync $false

2. Absence of Monitoring for Synchronization Failures

⚡PowerShell

1# Automated monitoring script
2$webhook = "https://outlook.office.com/webhook/..."
3$errors = Get-ADSyncRunStepResult -RunHistoryId (Get-ADSyncRunProfileResult)[0].RunHistoryId | Where-Object {$_.StepResult -ne "Success"}
4 
5if ($errors) {
6    Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $webhook -Method Post -Body ($errors | ConvertTo-Json)
7}

3. Incorrect sourceAnchor Configuration

⚡PowerShell

1# Validate sourceAnchor
2$connector = Get-ADSyncConnector | Where-Object {$_.Type -eq "AD"}
3if ($connector.Parameters['UserSourceAnchor'] -ne 'ms-DS-ConsistencyGuid') {
4    Write-Error "Unsecured sourceAnchor configuration detected"
5}

4. Excessive AD Permissions

⚡PowerShell

1# Audit permissions
2$syncAccount = "MSOL_[identifier]"
3$permissions = Get-ACL "AD:\CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=com" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Access | Where-Object {$_.IdentityReference -match $syncAccount}

5. Absence of Centralized Logs

💪Bicep

1// Log Analytics configuration for Entra Connect
2resource workspace 'Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces@2021-12-01-preview' = {
3  name: 'EntraConnectMonitoring'
4  location: resourceGroup().location
5  properties: {
6    retentionInDays: 90
7    features: {
8      enableLogAccessUsingOnlyResourcePermissions: true
9    }
10  }
11}

30/60/90 Day Implementation Plan

Days 1-30: Assessment and Emergency Protection

Week 1: Complete audit with identification of vulnerable accounts
Week 2: Implementation of synchronization exclusions
Week 3: Deployment of monitoring and alerts
Week 4: Validation testing and documentation

Days 31-60: Hardening and Automation

Migration to certificate-based authentication
Automation of daily audits
Training of teams on new processes
Implementation of least privilege principle in AD

Days 61-90: Preparation for March 2026 Changes

Testing in pre-production environment
Validation with Microsoft Support
Documented rollback plan
Post-compromise recovery exercises

Critical Deadline

Application changes will be effective in March 2026. No extensions will be granted.

Resources and Documentation

Official Microsoft Links

Additional PowerShell Scripts

⚡PowerShell

1# GitHub repository with remediation scripts
2# git clone https://github.com/Microsoft/EntraConnectSecurity

Technical Glossary

Hard-match: Process of associating AD and Entra ID objects based on common attributes
OnPremisesObjectIdentifier: Entra ID attribute storing the GUID of the source AD object
SourceAnchor: Immutable attribute used for permanent object association
ImmutableId: Base64 identifier of the sourceAnchor in Entra ID
SyncJacking: Exploitation technique using hard-match to compromise cloud accounts

Immediate Action Required

Start Your Audit Today

Every day of delay increases your exposure. Run the audit script now and implement emergency protections within 48 hours.

Securing your hybrid identity infrastructure is not optional. The March 2026 changes will permanently block this vulnerability, but only if your configuration is correct. Validate, protect, and prepare yourself now.

Introduction

Microsoft is deploying critical application changes in March 2026 to block this attack. Without action on your part, your hybrid infrastructure remains vulnerable.

Critical Impact

This vulnerability affects all tenants using Entra Connect Sync or Cloud Sync with privileged cloud-only accounts.

Technical Anatomy of the SyncJacking Attack

Hard-match Principle

userPrincipalName (UPN)
mail or proxyAddresses
ImmutableId (mapped from objectGUID or ms-DS-ConsistencyGuid)

Attack Vector

The exploitation follows this sequence:

Target Reconnaissance

The attacker identifies a privileged cloud-only account (ex: BreakGlass@contoso.onmicrosoft.com) without OnPremisesObjectIdentifier attribute.

Creation of Malicious Object

Creation of an on-premises AD user with corresponding attributes:

⚡PowerShell

1# DO NOT EXECUTE - Attack Example
2New-ADUser -Name "FakeBreakGlass" `
3  -UserPrincipalName "BreakGlass@contoso.onmicrosoft.com" `
4  -EmailAddress "BreakGlass@contoso.onmicrosoft.com"

Synchronization and Overwrite

During the next synchronization cycle, Entra Connect performs a hard-match and overwrites the cloud object with properties of the on-premises object, including the password.

Exploit Architecture

MERMAID

1graph LR
2    A[AD On-Premises] -->|Sync| B[Entra Connect]
3    B -->|Hard-Match| C[Entra ID]
4    D[Privileged Cloud Account] -.->|Overwritten| C
5    E[Attacker] -->|Controls| A

Microsoft Application Changes - March 2026

OnPremisesObjectIdentifier Behavior Modifications

Behavior	Before March 2026	After March 2026
Hard-match on cloud-only	Silently Allowed	Blocked with explicit error
OnPremisesObjectIdentifier Validation	Post-synchronization	Pre-synchronization
Logging of attempts	Minimal	Detailed with correlation ID
Recovery API	Not available	Dedicated Graph endpoint

New Error Codes

{}JSON

1{
2  "error": {
3    "code": "HardMatchBlockedOnCloudOnlyAccount",
4    "message": "Hard-match attempt blocked on cloud-only privileged account",
5    "details": {
6      "targetObjectId": "guid",
7      "sourceAnchor": "base64",
8      "correlationId": "guid"
9    }
10  }
11}

Vulnerability Audit: Identify Your Exposure

Complete PowerShell Audit Script

⚡PowerShell

1# Connection to required modules
2Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "User.Read.All", "Directory.Read.All"
3Import-Module ActiveDirectory
4 
5# Audit function for at-risk accounts
6function Test-SyncJackingVulnerability {
7    param(
8        [string]$DomainSuffix = "onmicrosoft.com"
9    )
10    
11    # 1. Retrieve all privileged cloud-only accounts
12    $privilegedRoles = @(
13        "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10", # Global Administrator
14        "e8611ab8-c189-46e8-94e1-60213ab1f814", # Privileged Role Administrator
15        "158c047a-c907-4556-b7ef-446551a6b5f7"  # Cloud Application Administrator
16    )
17    
18    $vulnerableAccounts = @()
19    
20    foreach ($roleId in $privilegedRoles) {
21        $roleMembers = Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $roleId
22        
23        foreach ($member in $roleMembers) {
24            $user = Get-MgUser -UserId $member.Id -Property Id,UserPrincipalName,OnPremisesSyncEnabled,OnPremisesImmutableId,OnPremisesDistinguishedName
25            
26            # Check if it is a cloud-only account
27            if (-not $user.OnPremisesSyncEnabled -and $user.UserPrincipalName -like "*$DomainSuffix") {
28                $vulnerableAccounts += [PSCustomObject]@{
29                    UserPrincipalName = $user.UserPrincipalName
30                    ObjectId = $user.Id
31                    HasImmutableId = [bool]$user.OnPremisesImmutableId
32                    RiskLevel = if (-not $user.OnPremisesImmutableId) { "CRITICAL" } else { "MEDIUM" }
33                }
34            }
35        }
36    }
37    
38    # 2. Check for corresponding AD objects
39    foreach ($account in $vulnerableAccounts) {
40        $upn = $account.UserPrincipalName
41        $adUser = Get-ADUser -Filter "UserPrincipalName -eq '$upn'" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
42        
43        if ($adUser) {
44            $account | Add-Member -NotePropertyName "ADObjectFound" -NotePropertyValue $true
45            $account.RiskLevel = "CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED"
46        }
47    }
48    
49    return $vulnerableAccounts
50}
51 
52# Execute audit
53$results = Test-SyncJackingVulnerability
54$results | Format-Table -AutoSize

Validation via Microsoft Graph API

⚡PowerShell

1# Graph query to identify accounts without OnPremisesObjectIdentifier
2$uri = "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users?`$filter=accountEnabled eq true and onPremisesSyncEnabled ne true&`$select=id,userPrincipalName,onPremisesImmutableId,createdDateTime&`$top=999"
3 
4$headers = @{
5    Authorization = "Bearer $accessToken"
6}
7 
8$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers $headers -Method Get
9$cloudOnlyUsers = $response.value | Where-Object { -not $_.onPremisesImmutableId }

Analysis of Entra Connect Logs

⚡PowerShell

1# Search in synchronization logs
2$syncLogs = Get-EventLog -LogName "Application" -Source "Directory Synchronization" -After (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
3$hardMatchEvents = $syncLogs | Where-Object { $_.Message -match "hard.*match|immutableid.*conflict" }

Technical Remediation Plan

Phase 1: Immediate Protection

Block Unauthorized Hard-Matches

Enable preventive protection via PowerShell:

⚡PowerShell

1# Entra Connect Configuration
2Set-ADSyncScheduler -SyncCycleEnabled $false
3 
4# Add filtering rules
5$rule = New-ADSyncRule `
6    -Name "Block CloudOnly HardMatch" `
7    -Direction Inbound `
8    -Precedence 50 `
9    -SourceObjectType user `
10    -TargetObjectType person `
11    -LinkType Join `
12    -Disabled $false

Implement Real-Time Monitoring

Deploy an Azure Monitor alert:

{}JSON

1{
2  "properties": {
3    "severity": "Sev0",
4    "enabled": true,
5    "scopes": ["/subscriptions/{subscription-id}/resourceGroups/{resource-group}/providers/Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/{workspace}"],
6    "evaluationFrequency": "PT5M",
7    "windowSize": "PT5M",
8    "criteria": {
9      "allOf": [{
10        "query": "AuditLogs | where OperationName == 'Update user' and TargetResources contains 'onPremisesImmutableId'",
11        "timeAggregation": "Count",
12        "operator": "GreaterThan",
13        "threshold": 0
14      }]
15    }
16  }
17}

Update Entra Connect

Verify and update your version:

⚡PowerShell

1# Minimum required version: 2.2.8.0
2$currentVersion = (Get-ADSyncGlobalSettings).Parameters | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "Microsoft.Synchronize.ServerConfigurationVersion"}
3 
4if ([version]$currentVersion.Value -lt [version]"2.2.8.0") {
5    Write-Warning "Critical update required!"
6    # Download from https://aka.ms/AADConnectDownload
7}

Phase 2: Advanced Configuration

Recommended Configuration

Enable certificate-based authentication for the Entra Connect service account to prevent password compromise.

⚡PowerShell

1# Configure connector with certificate
2$cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -Subject "CN=EntraConnectSync" -CertStoreLocation "Cert:\LocalMachine\My" -KeyExportPolicy Exportable -KeySpec Signature -KeyLength 2048 -HashAlgorithm SHA256
3 
4# Export and configuration
5$certPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "ComplexP@ssw0rd!" -Force -AsPlainText
6Export-PfxCertificate -Cert $cert -FilePath "C:\EntraConnect\sync-cert.pfx" -Password $certPassword

Complete Validation Checklist

Recommended Weekly Validation

This checklist should be executed weekly until the complete application of March 2026 changes.

[ ] Audit of privileged cloud-only accounts: Execute the PowerShell audit script
[ ] OnPremisesObjectIdentifier verification: Confirm that all critical accounts have an immutable identifier
[ ] Analysis of synchronization logs: Search for suspicious hard-match attempts
[ ] Entra Connect version: Verify version 2.2.8.0 or higher
[ ] Synchronization rules: Validate exclusions for critical UPNs
[ ] Active monitoring: Confirm Azure Monitor alerts are operational
[ ] Identifier backup: Back up OnPremisesImmutableId of privileged accounts
[ ] Recovery test: Validate post-compromise restoration procedure
[ ] Attribute filtering: Verify that userPrincipalName is not synchronized for onmicrosoft.com domains
[ ] AD permissions audit: Limit who can create objects in synchronized OUs

Frequent Errors and Solutions

1. Synchronization of BreakGlass Accounts

Critical Error

Never include emergency accounts in the synchronization scope.

⚡PowerShell

1# Correct exclusion
2Set-ADSyncSchedulerConnectorOverride -ConnectorIdentifier $connectorId -FullImportRequired $true -FullSyncRequired $true
3Add-ADSyncAADCompanyFeature -ForcePasswordSync $false -ForceUserPrincipalNameSync $false

2. Absence of Monitoring for Synchronization Failures

⚡PowerShell

1# Automated monitoring script
2$webhook = "https://outlook.office.com/webhook/..."
3$errors = Get-ADSyncRunStepResult -RunHistoryId (Get-ADSyncRunProfileResult)[0].RunHistoryId | Where-Object {$_.StepResult -ne "Success"}
4 
5if ($errors) {
6    Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $webhook -Method Post -Body ($errors | ConvertTo-Json)
7}

3. Incorrect sourceAnchor Configuration

⚡PowerShell

1# Validate sourceAnchor
2$connector = Get-ADSyncConnector | Where-Object {$_.Type -eq "AD"}
3if ($connector.Parameters['UserSourceAnchor'] -ne 'ms-DS-ConsistencyGuid') {
4    Write-Error "Unsecured sourceAnchor configuration detected"
5}

4. Excessive AD Permissions

⚡PowerShell

1# Audit permissions
2$syncAccount = "MSOL_[identifier]"
3$permissions = Get-ACL "AD:\CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=com" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Access | Where-Object {$_.IdentityReference -match $syncAccount}

5. Absence of Centralized Logs

💪Bicep

1// Log Analytics configuration for Entra Connect
2resource workspace 'Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces@2021-12-01-preview' = {
3  name: 'EntraConnectMonitoring'
4  location: resourceGroup().location
5  properties: {
6    retentionInDays: 90
7    features: {
8      enableLogAccessUsingOnlyResourcePermissions: true
9    }
10  }
11}

30/60/90 Day Implementation Plan

Days 1-30: Assessment and Emergency Protection

Week 1: Complete audit with identification of vulnerable accounts
Week 2: Implementation of synchronization exclusions
Week 3: Deployment of monitoring and alerts
Week 4: Validation testing and documentation

Days 31-60: Hardening and Automation

Migration to certificate-based authentication
Automation of daily audits
Training of teams on new processes
Implementation of least privilege principle in AD

Days 61-90: Preparation for March 2026 Changes

Testing in pre-production environment
Validation with Microsoft Support
Documented rollback plan
Post-compromise recovery exercises

Critical Deadline

Application changes will be effective in March 2026. No extensions will be granted.

1# GitHub repository with remediation scripts
2# git clone https://github.com/Microsoft/EntraConnectSecurity

Technical Glossary

Hard-match: Process of associating AD and Entra ID objects based on common attributes
OnPremisesObjectIdentifier: Entra ID attribute storing the GUID of the source AD object
SourceAnchor: Immutable attribute used for permanent object association
ImmutableId: Base64 identifier of the sourceAnchor in Entra ID
SyncJacking: Exploitation technique using hard-match to compromise cloud accounts

Immediate Action Required

Start Your Audit Today

Every day of delay increases your exposure. Run the audit script now and implement emergency protections within 48 hours.

SyncJacking: Secure Your Hybrid Identity Before March 2026

Target Reconnaissance

Creation of Malicious Object

Synchronization and Overwrite

Block Unauthorized Hard-Matches

Implement Real-Time Monitoring

Update Entra Connect

Houssem MAKHLOUF

Related articles

Azure Copilot Observability Agent: Diagnosing Your Applications

New Microsoft 365 Security Adoption Model

Choosing the Right Extension Type in Microsoft Entra

SyncJacking: Secure Your Hybrid Identity Before March 2026

Target Reconnaissance

Creation of Malicious Object

Synchronization and Overwrite

Block Unauthorized Hard-Matches

Implement Real-Time Monitoring

Update Entra Connect

Houssem MAKHLOUF

Related articles

Azure Copilot Observability Agent: Diagnosing Your Applications

New Microsoft 365 Security Adoption Model

Choosing the Right Extension Type in Microsoft Entra