Your break-glass accounts use phishing-resistant authentication, and yet an administrator with a broad role can still change their properties, their authentication methods or the group that excludes them from Conditional Access. A Microsoft Entra ID restricted management administrative unit (RMAU), formerly Azure AD, closes that gap. You will learn how to create it, monitor it, unlock it cleanly and understand its limits before deploying it to production.
Why strong authentication is not enough for an emergency account
Microsoft recommends keeping at least two cloud-only emergency access accounts, permanently assigned to the Global Administrator role and reserved for situations where the usual administrator accounts are unusable. The current Microsoft Learn documentation favors passkeys (FIDO2) or certificate-based authentication (CBA): these passwordless methods satisfy the mandatory multifactor authentication requirement. It also calls for an active, permanent Global Administrator assignment in PIM, and for validating the accounts at least every 90 days.
All of this protects the sign-in. There is a second plane, the management of directory objects:
- Authentication protection: how the account signs in.
- Management protection: who can modify the account, its authentication methods and the groups around it.
The most sensitive point is the security group that excludes emergency accounts from Conditional Access (CA) policies. Whoever can quietly add another account to it obtains a way around the policies that constrain every other administrator.
What a sealed RMAU locks down, and what it leaves open
An RMAU creates a management boundary around users, security groups and devices. Tenant-wide administration roles no longer automatically grant the right to modify these objects: a role assigned at the RMAU scope is required. Even a Global Administrator not assigned to that scope cannot modify the object directly, and the same applies to applications with Microsoft Graph permissions.
The "sealed" pattern is a design description, not a separate feature: the RMAU contains only the two emergency accounts and the exclusion group, and no administrator holds a permanent assignment in it. It then works as a lock (the usual roles are no longer enough) and as a detection trap (any change goes through an auditable action).
| Item | Effect of the sealed RMAU | What remains possible |
|---|---|---|
| Properties, password, account deletion | Blocked for any administrator not assigned to the scope, including Global Administrator and Graph applications | A Global Administrator or a Privileged Role Administrator can modify the scope itself |
| Exclusion group members | Blocked; being the group owner is not enough | Removing the group from the RMAU or assigning a role scoped to the RMAU |
| Account sign-in | No effect: the RMAU does not touch authentication | The account authenticates as before |
| Conditional Access policies | Not protected | A CA administrator can remove the exclusion directly in the policy |
| Membership in other groups, Exchange settings, licenses | Not covered | Remain manageable: monitor separately |
An RMAU does not neutralize a Global Administrator
The Microsoft Learn documentation specifies that Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator can manage the RMAU, notably by assigning themselves a role over its scope, without being able to modify its objects directly. This is necessary for recovery, but it requires monitoring: without alerts, the lock is just a formality.
Two design details to remember. Adding the group to the RMAU protects the group (name and members), not the accounts that are members of it: the accounts must be added directly. And the restricted management option can only be chosen when the unit is created: it cannot be enabled on an existing administrative unit.
Prerequisites, licenses and limits to know before creating the unit
The following figures come from the Microsoft Learn documentation on directory service limits and licensing.
30
Maximum administrative units per Entra resource
Microsoft Learn
100
Maximum RMAUs per tenant
Microsoft Learn
90 days
Minimum validation frequency for emergency accounts
Microsoft Learn
On the licensing side, creating administrative units is available with Entra ID Free. RMAUs require an Entra ID P1 license for each administrator of the unit, and a Free license for members. In a sealed design, with no assigned administrator, your protected emergency accounts therefore do not need P1.
Three constraints apply to the exclusion group:
- It must be a plain security group: Microsoft 365 groups, mail-enabled security groups and distribution lists are not supported.
- Its visibility must remain private: a public group allows self-service membership even within an RMAU, a configuration that Microsoft discourages and presents as a temporary limitation.
- It must contain exactly your two emergency accounts.
No Entra ID governance for objects in an RMAU
Users and groups placed in an RMAU cannot be managed with Privileged Identity Management, entitlement management, lifecycle workflows or access reviews. Your quarterly validation of break-glass accounts will therefore remain a manual control, to be recorded in the runbook. For scoping privileged roles, see our guide on Entra ID PIM and just-in-time access.
Implementation
This section creates the RMAU and places the accounts and the group in it. Minimum role: Privileged Role Administrator. Required module: Microsoft.Graph.Authentication (Install-Module Microsoft.Graph.Authentication -Scope CurrentUser). The script requests the scopes AdministrativeUnit.ReadWrite.All, User.Read.All and Group.Read.All, uses Microsoft Graph REST calls and outputs the created unit with its members. The -DryRun parameter checks the accounts and the group without writing anything.
Irreversible setting: review before running
IsMemberManagementRestricted can no longer be changed after the unit is created. Once the accounts are added, unassigned administrators will no longer be able to modify them directly. Always run a first execution with -DryRun, and check that you have the unlock procedure described below.
In the Microsoft Entra admin center:
- Go to Entra ID > Roles & admins > Administrative units then select Add.
- Name:
RMAU-BreakGlass, with a description that forbids adding other objects. - Set Restricted management administrative unit to Yes: this is the only moment it is possible.
- Leave Assign roles empty, then Review + create > Create.
- Open the unit: Users > Add member for the two accounts, then Groups > Add for the exclusion group.
Proving that the lock holds
Validation matters as much as creation. Protections take effect a few minutes after an addition; wait before testing.
Test with an unassigned Global Administrator
Open an emergency account in Entra ID > Users. The Overview page should indicate that the user belongs to a restricted management administrative unit. Password reset, property changes, deletion and authentication method changes should all fail.
Test with a Groups Administrator or User Administrator
Open the exclusion group, Members tab, and try Add members: the same message is displayed and the addition fails.
Check roles and sign-in
Verify that the accounts keep Global Administrator as an active, permanent assignment. During the next drill, sign in with one of them: an RMAU has no effect on authentication.
Read the audit log
In Entra ID > Monitoring & health > Audit logs, filter on the AdministrativeUnit category: the creation of the unit and the addition of the members should appear.
Unlocking and resealing: the procedure to write before the incident
One day, a FIDO2 key will need to be replaced or an account removed. In a sealed RMAU, this goes through a deliberate, logged unlock. Write the procedure now and store it with the break-glass runbook.
A product limitation dictates the choice of method: roles assigned at the scope of an administrative unit can only reset passwords and manage authentication methods for non-administrator users. No role at this scope can reset the password of a Global Administrator. To modify the account itself, you must therefore remove it from the RMAU. To modify the members of the exclusion group, a role scoped to the RMAU is enough.
Track the change and warn the monitoring team
Open a change request and inform the security team: the alert that is about to fire must be expected.
Lift the protection to the strict minimum
For the account: RMAU-BreakGlass > Users, select it then Remove member. For the group: Roles and administrators > Groups Administrator > Add assignments, with a temporary one-hour assignment.
Make the authorized change
Replace the key, rotate the secret or update the members, and nothing else.
Reseal immediately
Add the account back (RMAU-BreakGlass > Users > Add member) or remove the temporary role assignment.
Archive the evidence
Check the removal and re-addition (or the assignment and its removal) in the audit log, then attach them to the change request.
Alerts, drills and troubleshooting
Since a Global Administrator can always unlock the RMAU, it is the alerts that turn the setup into a control. Send the Entra audit logs to a Log Analytics workspace (Entra ID > Monitoring & health > Diagnostic settings, category AuditLogs), then create an alert rule that runs every 5 to 15 minutes. Microsoft Learn indicates that the logs cover RMAU creation, the addition or removal of members and roles scoped to the RMAU.
First KQL query: membership changes and scoped roles.
1// Appartenance et rôles étendus d'une unité à gestion restreinte2AuditLogs3| where OperationName in (4 'Add member to restricted management administrative unit',5 'Remove member from restricted management administrative unit',6 'Add member to role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit',7 'Remove member from role scoped over Restricted Management Administrative Unit')8 or (Category == 'AdministrativeUnit' and OperationName has 'Delete')9| extend Actor = coalesce(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName))10| extend Target = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)11| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, Actor, Target, Result, CorrelationIdSecond query: any modification of the three protected objects. Replace the three object IDs with your own.
1// Toute activité d'audit visant les comptes d'urgence ou leur groupe2let protege = dynamic(['<objectId-breakglass-1>', '<objectId-breakglass-2>', '<objectId-groupe-exclusion>']);3AuditLogs4| where tostring(TargetResources) has_any (protege)5| extend Actor = coalesce(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName))6| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, Actor, ResultCheck the exact operation names in your tenant's logs before publishing the rule. Add separate alerts for emergency account sign-ins and for Conditional Access policy changes, since the RMAU does not protect the latter. Finally, schedule a drill: remove an account from the RMAU and add it back right away, without changing anything. The alert must arrive within the rule's execution interval and both events must appear in the log. Pair it with the quarterly sign-in test.
| Symptom | Likely cause | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| Restricted management cannot be enabled on an existing unit | The setting can only be chosen at creation | Create a new unit with isMemberManagementRestricted set to true and move the objects into it |
| A user in the exclusion group remains modifiable | Only the group was added to the RMAU, not its members | Add each emergency account directly to the RMAU |
| The group cannot be added to the RMAU | Microsoft 365 group, mail-enabled group or distribution list | Use a plain security group for the exclusion |
| A Global Administrator cannot reset the password of an emergency account | No unit-scoped role covers a Global Administrator | Remove the account from the RMAU, intervene, then put it back |
| Users join the exclusion group on their own | Public visibility, self-service membership possible | Switch the group to private visibility |
| No alert when a member is removed | AuditLogs not exported, or different operation name | Check the diagnostic settings and the operation names actually logged |
| Cannot start an access review on the accounts | Objects in an RMAU are excluded from Entra ID governance features | Document a manual validation every 90 days |
Frequently asked questions
Do you need an Entra ID P1 license to protect break-glass accounts with an RMAU?
RMAUs require an Entra ID P1 license for each administrator of the unit, and a Free license for members. In a sealed design, with no assigned administrator, the protected accounts do not need P1. If you later assign a scoped role to someone, that person will need one.
Can an existing administrative unit be turned into an RMAU?
No. Restricted management can only be chosen when the unit is created. You must create a new unit with this setting enabled, then place the objects in it.
Can a Global Administrator still bypass an RMAU?
They cannot modify the protected objects directly, but they can manage the RMAU itself, for example by removing a member or assigning themselves a role over its scope. These actions are recorded in the audit logs, hence the value of the alerts described above.
Can the exclusion group be a Microsoft 365 group?
No. Security groups are supported, but not Microsoft 365 groups, mail-enabled security groups or distribution lists.
Can accounts in an RMAU go through access reviews?
No. Users and groups in an RMAU cannot be managed with Privileged Identity Management, entitlement management, lifecycle workflows and access reviews. Validating emergency accounts every 90 days remains manual.
Where to start
Start with the RMAU dedicated to emergency accounts: it contains three objects and validates your alerting chain at the same time. Warn level 1 support, who will see restricted management messages and must know who to pass the request to.
Actions to plan
- Confirm that the two accounts are cloud-only, active and permanent Global Administrators, with passkeys (FIDO2) or certificate-based authentication
- Verify that the exclusion group is a plain security group, with private visibility, and that it contains only these accounts
- Run the script with -DryRun, then create RMAU-BreakGlass with no assigned administrator
- Publish the two KQL rules and test the alert with a planned unlock
- Check the exclusion of emergency accounts in the CA policies managed by Microsoft: some report-only policies automatically switch to On on the scheduled date
- Write the unlock procedure and the 90-day validation schedule
If your organization still has many Global Administrators, reduce their number first: our article on the number of global administrators in Microsoft 365 gives the benchmarks. If a Conditional Access lockout worries you more, complement this with the Conditional Access configuration for Entra ID account recovery.
Going further
- Restricted management administrative units in Microsoft Entra ID: supported object types, blocked operations, roles that can manage the RMAU, audit logs and limitations.
- Manage emergency access accounts in Microsoft Entra ID: authentication methods, Conditional Access exclusions, monitoring and 90-day validations.
- Create or delete administrative units: step-by-step creation, portal and PowerShell/Graph, with isMemberManagementRestricted set to true.
- Microsoft Entra licensing: licenses required for administrators and members of an RMAU.
- Entra ID PIM: configuring just-in-time privileged access: scoping privileged roles around your emergency accounts.



